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Executive Summary
In 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Third Assessment
Report revealed important increases in the level of consensus concerning the reality of
human-caused climate warming. The scientific basis for global warming has thus been
sufficiently established to enable meaningful planning of appropriate policy responses to
address global warming. As a result, the world's policymakers, governments, industries,
energy producers/planners, and individuals from many other walks of life have
increased their attention toward finding acceptable solutions to the challenge of global
warming. This laudable increase in worldwide attention to this global-scale challenge
has not, however, led to a heightened optimism that the required substantial carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions reductions deemed necessary to stabilize the global climate
can be achieved anytime soon.  This fact is due in large part to several fundamental
aspects of the climate system that interact to ensure that climate change is a phenome-
non that will emerge over extensive time scales.
Although most of the warming observed during the 20th century is attributed to
increased greenhouse gas concentrations, because of the high heat capacity of the
world’s oceans, further warming will lag added greenhouse gas concentrations by
decades to centuries.  Thus, today’s enhanced atmospheric CO2 concentrations have
already “wired in” a certain amount of future warming in the climate system, independ-
ent of human actions.  Furthermore, as atmospheric CO2 concentrations increase, the
world’s natural CO2 “sinks” will begin to saturate, diminishing their ability to remove CO2
from the atmosphere.  Future warming will also eventually cause melting of the
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, which will contribute substantially to sea-level rise,
but only over hundreds to thousands of years. As a result, current generations have, in
effect, decided to make future generations pay most of the direct and indirect costs of
this major global problem.  The longer the delay in reducing CO2 and other greenhouse
gas emissions, the greater the burden of climate change will be for future life on earth.  
Collectively, these phenomena comprise a “Global Warming Dilemma.”  On the one
hand, the current level of global warming to date appears to be comparatively benign,
about 0.6°C.  This seemingly small warming to date has thus hardly been sufficient to
spur the world to pursue aggressive CO2 emissions reductions.  On the other hand, the
decision to delay global emissions reductions in the absence of a current crisis is
essentially a commitment to accept large levels of climate warming and sea-level rise
for many centuries.  This dilemma is a difficult obstacle for policymakers to overcome,
although better education of policymakers regarding the long-term consequences of cli-
mate change may assist in policy development.    
The policy challenge is further exacerbated by factors that lie outside the realm of sci-
ence.  There are a host of values conflicts that conspire to prevent meaningful preventa-
tive actions on the global scale.  These values conflicts are deeply rooted in our very
globally diverse lifestyles and our national, cultural, religious, political, economic, envi-
ronmental, and personal belief systems.  This vast diversity of values and priorities
inevitably leads to equally diverse opinions on who or what should pay for preventing or
experiencing climate change, how much they should pay, when, and in what form.
Ultimately, the challenge to all is to determine the extent to which we will be able to con-
tribute to limiting the magnitude of this problem so as to preserve the quality of life for
many future generations of life on earth.
4 The Long Time Scales of Human-Caused Climate Warming 
I. Introduction to Human Caused Climate Warming and the
“Global Warming Dilemma”
This essay discusses the global implications of the very long time scales associated with
human-caused climate warming (popularly termed  “global warming”).  This emphasis is
chosen because of the major impact that these long time scales will likely have on how
policy decisions concerning this problem will be determined over the 21st century.
In 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Third Assessment
Report, Climate Change 2001, revealed important increases in the level of consensus con-
cerning the reality of human-caused climate warming during 21st century and beyond
(IPCC, 2001). In addition, at the request of U.S. President George W. Bush, the National
Research Council of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences issued a special report,
Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, that endorsed the key con-
clusions of the IPCC assessment (NRC, 2001).  The scientific basis for global warming
has thus now been sufficiently established to enable meaningful planning of appropriate
policy responses to address global warming.
The key IPCC (2001) climate-change conclusions are as follows.  Atmospheric carbon
dioxide (CO2) concentrations have increased from about 280 parts per million by volume
(ppmv) in the 18th century to nearly 370 ppmv in the year 2002 and are expected to at
least double pre-industrial concentrations before the end of the 21st century.  The global
average surface-air temperature has increased over the 20th century by about 0.6°C.
IPCC specifically noted that “There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming
over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.”  These strong conclusions have
led to an increasing level of public recognition of the reality of the global warming problem.
The IPCC report also stated that the global average surface-air temperature is projected to
increase by an additional 1.4°C to 5.8°C over the period 1990 to 2100.  This range incor-
porates both “best-guess” estimates of the present uncertainties in climate model projec-
tions and of the uncertainties in policy decisions concerning future CO2 and other green-
house gas emissions into the atmosphere over this century.  
The IPCC and earlier national climate change assessments have described a number of
likely detrimental impacts on humans and other organisms if global warming plays out con-
sistently with the increasingly accepted international scientific consensus (IPCC, 2001;
USGCRP, 2001).  Listed below are some regional climate changes generally expected with
a global warming of the magnitude projected by IPCC (2001).1 Land areas are very likely
to warm more than oceanic areas. Although projected atmospheric CO2 concentrations are
very likely to increase global mean surface-air temperatures, high northern latitudes are
very likely to warm more than other areas. Summertime, mid-continental areas are likely to
be considerably less able to sustain current levels of soil moisture. In moist subtropical
areas such as the southeastern United States, the summertime heat index (a measure of
the additional feeling of heat discomfort due to high atmospheric moisture concentrations)
is likely to add roughly another 50 percent sense of warming, beyond the increased tem-
perature warming effect (Delworth, et. al, 1999).  Hurricanes are likely to become more
intense, and contribute considerably more rainfall to land surfaces. Perennial Arctic sea ice
is likely to virtually disappear.  The overturning circulation of the Atlantic Ocean is likely to
The Long Time Scales of Human-Caused Climate Warming 5
weaken noticeably, although models differ in the magnitude and timing of the weaken-
ing. Sea level is virtually certain to rise due to thermal expansion of the warming world
ocean and to increasing melting of glaciers and ice sheets. 
Other speculated effects of climate change are frequently discussed but are far more
scientifically uncertain at this time. Examples include more extra-tropical storms, more
frequent and more intense El Nino episodes, planet-saving negative feedbacks (natural
processes that might sharply reduce the level of climate warming), a CO2-enhanced
greening of the biosphere, more frequent hurricanes and tornados, and catastrophic
weather extremes. At this time, none of these often-cited potential outcomes are con-
sistent with the current state of scientific knowledge about climate change. It is very
likely, however, that we will continue to hear such assertions, often to buttress a partic-
ular point of view about policy preferences.
It is useful to point out here that the science of global warming indicates that a quadru-
pling of atmospheric CO2 over pre-industrial levels would essentially double the climate
changes expected from the anticipated CO2 doubling.  This magnitude of global warm-
ing, under today’s best estimates, is expected to lead to very substantial negative
impacts on earth’s life systems.  Why is this relevant? To date, most assessments of
future warming and the subsequent impacts are based upon an assumed doubling of
atmospheric CO2.  Although stabilizing CO2 concentrations at a doubling remains
achievable with the implementation of highly focused global CO2 emissions reduction
policies over the 21st century, to a reasonable approximation, quadrupling of CO2 is
where earth is headed under “business as usual” scenarios.  Therefore, most assess-
ments of global warming have not yet considered its full implications.   
Because of the increasingly strong conclusions concerning the expected effects of
human activities on the warming of earth's climate, the world's policymakers, govern-
ments, industries, energy producers/planners, and many other walks of human life
have increased their attention toward finding acceptable solutions to the challenge of
global warming. This laudable increase in the worldwide attention given to this global-
scale challenge has not, however, led to a heightened optimism that the required sub-
stantial CO2 emissions reductions can be achieved anytime soon.  The global warming
problem contains many distinct facets that combine to produce what is called here the
“Global Warming Dilemma.”
The Global Warming Dilemma can be summarized in the following manner.  On the
one hand, large increases in atmospheric CO2 concentrations have occurred, with con-
siderably more “in the pipeline.”  Yet, the magnitude of documented warming to date is
comparatively small, about 0.6°C.  This relatively benign increase is hardly enough to
warrant major concerns about the viability of earth’s life systems.  Thus, there has been
little motivation today to resort to a major effort to reduce global CO2 emissions.  On
the other hand, delaying major CO2 emissions reductions until substantial climate
warming occurs would very likely “wire in” the world to globally troublesome global
warming for many centuries.  Thus, the science tells us that major efforts will be
required to restrain the final global warming to relatively benign levels.  Therefore, the
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choices are quite daunting:  we can make very large policy commitments now with little
visible short-term payback, or we can delay policy action indefinitely (the de facto current
strategy), with very large coping and adaptation costs decades and centuries from now.
This is the Global Warming Dilemma.
The Global Warming Dilemma arises because of a number of separate physical effects
operative in the climate system, the sum of which are almost guaranteed to shape future
policy deliberations in important new ways. The Global Warming Dilemma is due to a vari-
ety of key scientific findings. The science of global warming tells us that the phenomenon
is real, its presence in the climate data is very likely consistent with model calculations,
and its most serious effects will be delayed for decades to centuries.  Reducing the likeli-
hood of serious damage from climate change requires substantial emissions reduction of
CO2 and other greenhouse gases over the first half of this century, but with most of the
damage-reducing benefits accruing to future generations of earth’s inhabitants.  This long
delay in such benefits introduces many challenges to the global policy response process.
These challenges will continue to produce considerable barriers to achieving meaningful
policy actions, nationally and globally.  A number of the factors that combine to produce
the Global Warming Dilemma are listed below.
The Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) has been thwarted by a major difficulty in achieving timely implementation
of the required social, political, technological, and infrastructure commitments on the
roughly one-decade time scale outlined in the protocol. In short, the protocol requires
the developed nations to achieve reductions of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere
due to burning of carbon-based fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas), but without
similar commitments from countries in the developing world whose CO2 emissions
are growing at a rapid rate.  Also, it is now clear that even complete implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol will not come close to mitigating the projected global warming.
On the contrary, full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would only imply a relative-
ly modest reduction in the rate of increase of global atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations.  Yet, four years after the initial UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in
1997, we still are without globally meaningful new CO2 emissions reduction policies.
Much of the blame for this is properly cast toward the inability of U.S. policy to be
guided by the science of climate change that has been mainly led by U.S. scientists
over the past three decades.  However, even if the United States abandons its ill-
advised resistance to implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, there are still major politi-
cal, technological, and socioeconomic barriers to implementation of a cohesive and
significant reduction of global CO2 emissions. 
A number of policymakers worldwide have adopted the superficially reasonable posi-
tion that if we can hold global CO2 emissions constant with time, we can strongly
reduce global warming to acceptable levels.  This is far from the truth. The generally
ignored, but invaluable, IPCC Climate Change Special Report on Radiative Forcing
of Climate Change made it dauntingly clear that no such "comfort zone" would exist,
even if this admittedly huge achievement of holding global CO2 emissions constant
with time were to be achieved (IPCC, 1994). Indeed, that report showed convincingly
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that it would very likely require a 60-80 percent reduction in today's emissions just
to keep CO2 concentrations from rising in the atmosphere. From a sociological,
geopolitical, and technological perspective, such a level of global CO2 emissions
cuts over the next several decades is exceptionally unlikely, given the continued
strong global growth since in CO2 emissions. Simply put, the major policy chal-
lenge will be how to reduce growth in CO2 emissions in the face of continued
demand for more energy in the developed nations, huge demand growth in the
developing nations, and the overall demands of an increasing world population.
Regardless, it is unlikely that any combination of achievable mitigation actions will
produce a world in which global atmospheric CO2 levels will always remain below
a doubling of the levels at pre-industrial times. 
It is fair to note that the IPCC (2001) did assert that it is technically feasible to mit-
igate CO2 emissions at a rate that would eventually stabilize CO2 concentrations
at below a doubling of pre-industrial levels.  However, the IPCC authors were very
well aware that actually achieving this would be very daunting on the global policy
side.  These insights lead to the realization that the actual level of climate warm-
ing will have to be considerably smaller than currently projected to prevent sub-
stantial future impacts on humans and most other life forms on earth.  It is fair to
note that many individuals remain optimistic that major reductions of greenhouse
gas emissions are achievable over the next decade or two.  The burden, however,
remains on them to propose clear and enforceable mechanisms by which such
major global CO2 emissions reductions would be achievable. 
Scientific studies show that if, by some unforeseen spectacular mitigation break-
through, all CO2 and other greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
were to be held constant at current levels, the earth's surface would still warm fur-
ther by about 0.5-1.5oC above today's record high levels (Wetherald et al., 2001).
This time lag in the realized warming is caused by the expected continued
absorption of much of the warming signal by the world ocean. Indeed, it may
require a thousand years to "catch up" with the warming level that would have
already been observed if earth had a very shallow ocean with very small heat
storage capacity (see Section 3).
The above points make it clear that the irreducibly high amount of minimum
warming already "wired in" reveals an unplanned global strategy of relying on
coping and/or adaptation to a substantial climate warming, no matter what policy-
makers do over the next decade or two.  Thus, all anticipated benefits of future
mitigation policies are much more for future humans, animals, and plants than
they are for earth's current inhabitants.
All carbon cycle models reveal a key insight: the more CO2 that is added to the
atmosphere over the next century or so, the longer newer emissions will remain in
the atmosphere. This is because the relatively "fast" uptake CO2 reservoirs (time
scale of decades), such as the upper ocean and the terrestrial biosphere, will
become nearly saturated with the CO2 already added to the atmosphere (IPCC,
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1994). What this reservoir saturation effect means is that the burden of the CO2
uptake over this century increasingly will shift to the next fastest reservoirs, such as
the intermediate layers of the ocean and the deeper layers of the terrestrial bios-
phere, a process that requires centuries. Further removal to the deepest ocean by
seafloor carbonates requires very roughly a thousand to ten thousand years. Thus,
as more CO2 is added to the atmosphere, the rate at which it is removed from the
atmosphere becomes progressively slower (see Section 4).
The very slow uptake of the climate warming signal by the ocean implies a very slow,
but inexorable, sea-level rise due to the slow warming of the ocean. This contribution
to sea-level rise is due to the elementary fact that warmer water occupies a larger
volume than colder water. All climate models, complex and simple, show global sea
level rising for more than a thousand years due to this delayed ocean warming effect.
The melting of the great Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets could contribute eventually to
tens of meters of sea-level rise, arguably most of it occurring on a time scale longer
than a thousand years. However, West Antarctic ice sheet melting could possibly add
to sea-level rise over the next few centuries (Oppenheimer, 1998).
Finally, the science of global warming has become increasingly solid over the past 20
years.  The essence of the problem is now rather well understood.  Some key uncer-
tainties remain, none of which are likely to change the essence of our understanding
of global warming.  However, much of the detailed regional information that is typical-
ly sought by policymakers will likely remain elusive, thus providing still more reasons
to evade commitment to globally meaningful CO2 emissions mitigation.  
These contributors to the Global Warming Dilemma make it very clear that addressing this
problem meaningfully is likely to be far more daunting than is currently perceived by the
policymakers, the press, and the world's educators.  The subsequent sections in this essay
will describe in more detail why the above-described contributors to the Global Warming
Dilemma are true, and why the science behind most of the sources of this dilemma is quite
solid and rather widely understood. Perspectives on lessons for policy challenges and poli-
cy barriers will be offered in Section 7.
II. Basics of the Atmospheric "Greenhouse Warming"
Phenomenon
This section explains the basic science of human-caused climate warming.2 It is designed
to be accessible to the “educated layperson” who is not an expert in atmospheric or cli-
mate sciences, but who has some grounding in the physical sciences.  The information
contained here can provide an improved understanding of the reasons behind why human-
caused climate change is a serious issue, why it is grounded in sound scientific principles,
and why this knowledge leads to the Global Warming Dilemma.  Readers who are either
well versed in the science of climate change or are not particularly interested in pursuing
the more difficult parts of the basic science can skip to Section 3 without significant loss of
capability to understand the key points in the remaining sections.
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Surprisingly, all of the physical drivers of the global warming problem are contained
within the atmosphere.  Despite being a region of relatively inconsequential mass,
water amount, and heat capacity, it is in the atmosphere that the temperature at the
earth's surface is ultimately determined. The special properties of the atmosphere
define the essence of how climate warming works.
The earth is strongly heated every day by incoming radiation from the sun. This heating
is offset by an equally strong infrared radiation leaving the planet. Interestingly, if Earth
were without any atmosphere, and if its surface reflectivity did not change, global mean
surface temperature would be roughly 33oC colder than it is today.  This large differ-
ence is due to the strong atmospheric absorption of infrared radiation leaving the
earth's surface. The major atmospheric infrared absorbers are clouds, water vapor, and
CO2. This strong infrared absorption (and strong reemission) effect is extremely robust.
It is readily measured in the laboratory and is straightforwardly measured from earth-
orbiting satellites. Simply put, adding CO2 to the atmosphere adds another "blanket" to
the planet and thus directly changes the heat balance of the earth's atmosphere.
Individuals skeptical about the reliability of global warming have correctly noted that, in
terms of direct trapping of outgoing infrared radiation, water vapor is by far the domi-
nant greenhouse gas on earth. Since water vapor dominates the current radiative bal-
ance, how can it be that CO2 is anything other than a minor contributor to earth's
absorption of infrared radiation? Part of the answer comes from the well-known model-
ing result that net planetary radiative forcing changes roughly linearly in response to
logarithmic changes in CO2.3 Thus, a quadrupling of CO2 gives another roughly 1oC
direct warming over the direct 1oC warming for a CO2 doubling, valid for the extreme
assumption that water vapor mixing ratios and clouds do not change.4 Interestingly,
this approximate relationship also holds for a large extended range as CO2 is
decreased.3
It is thus hard to escape the conclusion that increasing atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions provide a measurable direct addition to the atmospheric trapping of the infrared
radiation leaving the surface of our planet. However, a simple comparison of the rela-
tive greenhouse efficiencies of water vapor and CO2 quickly becomes problematic
because water vapor enters the climate system mostly as a "feedback'' gas.
All models and observations currently indicate that as climate warms or cools, the
observed and calculated global-mean relative humidity of water vapor remains roughly
constant as the climate changes, whereas its mixing ratio does not.5 Thus, as climate
warms (cools), the holding capacity of atmospheric water vapor increases (decreases)
exponentially. This is a powerful water vapor positive feedback mechanism—that is, a
process that acts to amplify the original warming caused by increasing CO2 levels. With
this major positive feedback, the modeled "climate sensitivity” increases by about a fac-
tor of three to roughly 3oC.6 Currently, observational evidence remains generally con-
sistent with the modeling results that project a strong positive water vapor mixing ratio
feedback under approximate constancy of relative humidity as the climate changes
(Oort and Liu, 1993; Sun and Held, 1996). 
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An additional, but smaller, positive feedback is the relationship between ice (or its
absence) at the earth's surface and its reflectivity of solar radiation. In essence, if ice or
snow cover melts, the surface left exposed (ground, vegetation, or water) is generally less
reflective of incoming solar radiation. This leads to more absorption of the solar radiation,
thus more warming, less ice and so on. This feedback is expected to become important as
snow lines retreat poleward and when polar ice sheets begin to melt at their lower-latitude
edges.
Inclusion of this "ice-reflectivity" feedback process in mathematical models of the climate
amplifies further the calculated warming response of the climate to increased concentra-
tions of CO2 and infrared absorbing gases. It would also amplify any calculated cooling if
ice at the earth’s surface were to increase. Other kinds of feedbacks, both positive and
negative, result from the interaction of land-surface properties (e.g., changes of vegetation
that lead to reflectivity and evaporation changes) with climate warming/cooling mecha-
nisms or from changes in CO2 uptake by the biosphere.  Both the ice-reflectivity and the
vegetation feedbacks still remain somewhat uncertain, particularly in their details on the
regional scale. 
The major source of uncertainty in determining climate feedback concerns the impact of
clouds on the radiative balance of the climate system.7 A CO2-induced increase in low
clouds would mainly act to reflect more solar radiation and would thus act to produce a
negative feedback to global warming. An increase in high clouds mainly adds to the
absorption of infrared radiation trying to escape the planet and would thus provide a posi-
tive feedback. A change in cloud microphysical and optical properties could go either way.
Which of these would dominate in an increasing CO2 world? We are not sure. Our inability
to answer this question with confidence is the major source of uncertainty in today's pro-
jections of how the climate would respond to increasing greenhouse gases.   Furthermore,
it is not likely that this cloud-radiation uncertainty will be sharply reduced within the next 5
years.  This is because there still remain formidable barriers in obtaining the needed cloud
measurements, in preparing sufficiently comprehensive cloud models, and in formulating
accurate theories of cloud behavior and cloud properties.
Although clouds dominate the climate modeling uncertainty, other key processes are also
in need of improved understanding and modeling capability. An example is the effect of
human-produced airborne particulates (aerosols) composed mostly of sulfate (from oxida-
tion of the sulfur in fossil fuels) or carbon (from open fires). Sulfate aerosols are mostly
reflective of solar radiation, producing a cooling effect, whereas carbonaceous aerosols in
the lower troposphere mostly absorb solar radiation, producing a net heating effect. Efforts
to reduce the current uncertainty are limited by inadequate measurements of aerosol con-
centrations and the sensitivity of climate to their radiative effects. Even more uncertain are
the so-called indirect effects that atmospheric aerosols play in the determination of cloud
amounts and their radiative properties.
Another key uncertainty lies in modeling the response of the ocean to changed green-
house gases. This affects the calculated rate of response of the climate over the next sev-
eral centuries.  For details, see Section 3. 
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III. The Climate-Regulating Role of the Global Ocean 
The description of the physics of global warming in Section 2 focused almost solely on
the physical processes acting in the atmosphere to explain the essence of this phe-
nomenon. Yet, as we shall see, the ocean plays a very important role in determining
how the expected climate warming will evolve over this and future centuries. 
Most people have experienced the mild shock of jumping into a body of water in mid-
to-late spring when the air temperature is warm, only to find out that the water tempera-
ture is much colder, while the opposite can be experienced in the cooler days of early
fall. This effect is mostly due to the much higher heat capacity of the ocean or a lake
relative to that of the overlying atmosphere. Even in moderately sized water bodies,
this produces a clear "seasonal lag" of the water temperature changes relative to the
march of the seasons.
Interestingly, a perceptive observer may have also noted that lakes and swimming
pools tend to cool off more efficiently than they warm up. In the fall, as the weather
cools, the upper water surface cools rather quickly. However, the cooling upper water
becomes denser and thus sinks efficiently to lower levels, thereby transferring the cool-
ing effect through the entire depth. As waters warm in the spring, the highest levels of a
lake can feel comfortably warm, but the unwary swimmer often experiences much cold-
er water a short distance below the surface. In this case the spring warming heats the
upper layer of the water, makes it less dense, and therefore the warmed water tends to
just remain at the top without appreciable downward mixing. 
A similar set of processes act over long time scales when the climate is changing. A
cooling climate can rather efficiently propagate the cooling signal to the interior of the
ocean. A warming climate tends to concentrate the heat in the upper levels of the
ocean and actually can produce an oceanic resistance to mixing the warming signal
downward. This effect can produce an early atmosphere/upper-ocean response to an
atmospheric warming forced by increased greenhouse gases. The ultimately realized
warming can become delayed for long time intervals because of the slow mixing of the
warming into the deeper ocean.
This effect is amplified greatly in the world ocean because it has a far greater heat
capacity than that of the atmosphere. Indeed, the heat-carrying capacity of the global
ocean is over 1000 times greater than that of the global atmosphere. This key observa-
tion carries many implications for how the atmosphere and earth’s surface can respond
over time to increasing atmospheric greenhouse gases.
Suppose, for example, that only, say, the top one meter of the ocean could "feel" the
atmosphere's heating and cooling effects, while the rest of the world ocean remained
totally disconnected (no circulation, no mixing, no exchange with the top meter). In this
case, the atmosphere/one-meter ocean system would respond within a year of a CO2-
added greenhouse warming of the climate. The upper meter of the ocean would soon
be in equilibrium with the current atmospheric CO2 amount and the time lag to equilibri-
um would be very short. (We used to use models like this to save computer time in
global warming calculations!)
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Now, suppose that our "one-meter lid” ocean is replaced with the real ocean, but with
nearly infinitely fast mixing all the way to the bottom. In this case, the rate of atmospheric
warming due to added CO2 would be sharply suppressed because the modest heat capac-
ity atmosphere would be losing its added heat to the cooler ocean with its more than 1000
times greater heat capacity.  In this case, one would have to wait for some time to even be
able to measure the amount of atmospheric warming. Indeed, the atmospheric warming
trend would be small relative to the natural variability of global-mean surface temperature
for a long time.
The real world lies between these hypothetical extremes. In reality, what we see from
earth's climate measuring systems is a lower atmosphere that is warming considerably
slower than an almost "atmosphere-only" planet would, but noticeably faster than it would
in the "infinitely fast mixing" ocean case.
A bottom line constraint is still applicable, however. The new climate cannot be in equilibri-
um until the ocean is no longer warming up, all the way to the bottom. Indeed, the last
degree or two   of warming could take well over a hundred years beyond the time that
greenhouse gas atmospheric concentrations have been stabilized, while the last few
tenths of a degree warming could require over a thousand years.
Most state-of-the-art climate models of global warming suggest a slowing down of the
ocean's overturning circulation, and thus less mixing of excess CO2 into the ocean. That
same slowing down phenomenon would also act to slow down the mixing of heat into the
deeper layers of the ocean. This effect acts to produce an earlier warming, but a delay of
the "end game" warming due to this suppression of mixing of the added heat into the inte-
rior of the ocean.
Levitus et al. (2001) demonstrated that most of the heat storage due to the warming of the
twentieth century is in the ocean, and not in the atmosphere, soil, or land glaciers. This
observational result is fully consistent with theoretical and modeling expectations. It is fair
to note, however, the rate of the oceanic mixing that eventually fills up the huge ocean
heat reservoir is a source of significant uncertainty in itself.
Oceanic mixing is also a factor in evaluating the observed 20th century warming in the
context of climate-change science.  The amount of global warming that has accumulated
to date is primarily determined by the amount of greenhouse gases added to the atmos-
phere, minus “offset” negative forcing caused by factors such as sulfate particles.
However, the rate at which such warming occurs is strongly dependent upon the rate at
which the warmer atmosphere loses some of its added heat through mixing it into the
ocean.  Also, the apparent warming or cooling effects due to decade-to-century-scale natu-
ral variability and to data imperfections must be considered.  Obviously, the climate model
calculations are also imperfect.  However, the very point of these types of studies is to
evaluate the credibility of the theory-based climate models.
These difficulties explain why the level of the scientific confidence about the match
between the observed 20th century warming and retrospective model calculations still has
to be expressed in probabilistic terms. The author has stated that there is a greater than
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90 percent chance that the observed warming to date is directly attributable to the
added greenhouse gases over the 20th century (Mahlman, 1997; IPCC, 2001).  The
remaining “messiness” in this key calculation would be lowered by more precise cli-
mate warming measurements and more accurate modeling of cloud-feedback process-
es and of the mixing of the warming signal into the ocean.  The confidence in this still-
imperfect model-data “match” has been elevated to this 90 percent level partly because
of the still-remaining lack of any alternative hypothesis that is either consistent with
observations, a self-consistent theoretical framework, or a quantitative model simula-
tion.
The multiple layers of the ocean thus will play a key role in how global warming will
unfold over the next century or two.  If ocean mixing does become strongly sup-
pressed, then the atmospheric warming rate with be temporally enhanced, but the long-
term delay in the final magnitude of warming will be extended even further in time.
IV. Natural Reservoirs for Atmospheric CO2
The perceptive reader might question why scientists and policymakers are so focused
on CO2 when it is well known that other powerful greenhouse gases such as methane,
nitrous oxide, lower atmospheric ozone, chlorofluorocarbons, and other manufactured
molecules, in combination, are currently adding nearly as much a greenhouse warming
forcing contribution as does CO2. Indeed, this understanding is already being used as
a policy tool for near-term priority setting: keep the powerful, long-lived greenhouse
gases out of the atmosphere now, because it is effective and comparatively inexpen-
sive to do so. This is a very appropriate mitigation strategy for the next decade or so.
On times scales of decades and longer, however, atmospheric CO2 concentrations will
have grown further and the “easy-mitigation” gases will be gradually exiting the atmos-
phere.  In the long run, however, CO2 dominates everything, including the effects of the
cooling sulfate particles, the substance that makes acid rain. The reason CO2 warming
overwhelms sulfate cooling is that sulfate lasts about a week in the atmosphere, while
added CO2 remains for roughly a century. Because of this difference, at today's emis-
sion rates of sulfur and CO2, sulfur concentrations will not grow further, while CO2 con-
centrations will continue to grow for centuries. The reason CO2 levels would continue to
grow for centuries at today's emission levels is that, for every unit of CO2 emitted,
about half of it is removed from the atmosphere and half stays, thus adding systemati-
cally to the atmosphere's CO2 concentrations.  As a result, the current rate of atmos-
pheric CO2 increase is about 0.5 percent per year, roughly 50 percent of annual global
CO2 emissions.
Superficially, a CO2 "piling-on" rate of 0.5 percent per year seems pretty small.
However, this current rate compounded gives a doubling of CO2 levels over pre-indus-
trial levels by the year 2100. This is actually quite significant, because all model calcu-
lations indicate that a doubling of CO2 would produce a substantial climate change with
likely significant impacts on human lives as well as most other life on earth (IPCC,
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2001). This observation seriously understates the challenge for two reasons. First, the cur-
rent “business as usual” growth rate of CO2 emissions projects a tripling over today's emis-
sions by 2100 (IPCC, 2001).  Second, as subsequent paragraphs will demonstrate, the
percentage of CO2 emissions remaining in the atmosphere is expected to increase steadily
with time as CO2 concentrations continue to grow. Thus, we expect that a progressively
higher fraction of CO2 will stay in the atmosphere as time progresses. Disconcertingly,
even constant CO2 emissions would progressively result in much more CO2 in the atmos-
phere. Surprisingly, to get the same 0.5 percent per year net CO2 increase we see today,
we would eventually have to emit progressively less CO2 than we do today.
Why is this the case? As known for over a decade (IPCC, 1994; IPCC 2001), the key so-
called "CO2 sinks" become progressively less efficient as more CO2 is added to the atmos-
phere. The scientific argument for this assertion is actually quite straightforward. When
extra CO2 first began to be added to the atmosphere through biomass and fossil-fuel burn-
ing, the "unburdened reservoirs" of the upper levels of the oceans and the terrestrial bios-
phere were able to absorb a relatively large fraction of the "new" CO2. However, over the
20th century, more and more CO2 has been deposited in these two "fast” reservoirs. As
these fast reservoirs eventually become nearly saturated, their ability to absorb newly
added CO2 will become progressively less efficient.
Added atmospheric CO2 acts to increase the concentration gradient of CO2 between the
atmosphere and the upper ocean, thus producing a relatively efficient exchange, at least
until the upper ocean becomes nearly saturated with the added CO2. Then the exchange
of CO2 between the atmosphere and the ocean becomes less efficient. This decreased
efficiency becomes important on time scales of decades to a century. Once this occurs,
the transfer of CO2 from atmosphere to ocean becomes limited by the exchange rate of
the upper ocean to the intermediate layers of the ocean, a process that is measured in
centuries. With further CO2 intrusions into the ocean on these century time scales, the
intermediate layers also would become saturated, thus limiting the oceanic “escape" of
CO2 from the atmosphere to even longer times, nearly 1000 years. Finally, the excess CO2
can only be slowly removed by dissolving seafloor carbonates (roughly 10,000 years). This
very slow process governs how atmospheric and oceanic CO2 are changed on geologic
time scales, probably not applicable to the global warming problem.
There are a number of other calculated climate feedback processes that may be applica-
ble to the oceanic uptake efficiency of excess atmospheric CO2. It is well known, for exam-
ple, that CO2 is considerably more soluble in cold water than it is in warm water. Consider,
for example, the difference in your experience of opening a slightly agitated cold carbonat-
ed beverage versus that of opening a similarly agitated warm one. Thus, warmer oceans
are more resistant to dissolving atmospheric CO2 than are colder ones. Surprisingly, this
effect is not thought to be a very important one in the CO2 ocean uptake context, due to
the comparatively weak dependence of CO2 solubility on temperature.
Another feedback process now calculated in most of today's climate models is that as cli-
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mate warming occurs, the large-scale overturning of the global ocean is likely to be
inhibited, thus reducing the efficiency of the overturning/mixing process that transports
the excess atmospheric CO2 into the interior of the ocean (Stouffer et al, 1989). This
process may inhibit the downward oceanic mixing of CO2 by roughly 10-40 percent.
The uncertainty in this effect remains substantial, due to a number of complicating fac-
tors that limit our understanding of oceanic overturning.
There are a number of other speculated biological mechanisms that possibly could
either accelerate or decelerate the process of oceanic drawing down of the excess
atmospheric CO2. Most of these are not considered likely to change our thinking sub-
stantially on this problem.  The role of the terrestrial biosphere in the uptake of atmos-
pheric CO2 remains somewhat problematic. It is clear that added CO2 is a "fertilizer" for
many plant species, increasing their growth rates (and thus their CO2 uptake rates),
assuming requisite water and nutrients are readily available. In unmanaged ecosys-
tems, this is often not true because the availability of water and nutrients is frequently
limited. Nevertheless, CO2 fertilization is still likely to be an important mechanism for
accelerated uptake of CO2. It has been argued, however, that net carbon storage in
soils and plants can be inhibited by accelerated biomass decomposition rates in the
future warmer, wetter climate, particularly so in biologically productive regions that are
already warm and moist.
One place where the terrestrial biosphere is projected to be a strong candidate for act-
ing to draw down higher levels of atmospheric CO2 is in formerly productive regions
that have been heavily deforested or cleared. In those regions, one would expect the
tendency to "rebuild" lost carbon would dominate over other processes. Finally, the ulti-
mate sink for excess CO2 is in the weathering of terrestrial silicate rocks, a process
requiring on the order of 100,000 years.
This section can be summarized by simply noting that the earth's scientific “deck” is
stacked to make atmospheric CO2 last in the future atmosphere considerably longer
than it does today. Thus, the higher the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere, the more diffi-
cult it will be to remove it if we begin to experience a climate that we no longer wish to
"live" with.
V. The Inertia of the Ice Sheets of Greenland and Antarctica
One of the anticipated outcomes of global warming is a tendency to produce melting of
the great ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica. An attention-grabbing, but mislead-
ing, statistic is that these ice sheets, if completely melted, would raise sea level by rough-
ly 70 meters.
It is clear from the geological record that ice sheets have melted and have grown. It is
also clear that these ice sheet advances and declines can require tens of thousands of
years to be completed. In fact, the ice sheet melting from the most recent ice age has
led to a roughly 100-120 meter sea level rise from 15,000 years to 6,000 years ago
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(roughly, a meter per century). Interestingly, this "recent" sea level rise occurred as a
rebound effect of the recovery from the last ice age. The effect of the ice sheet growth, sea
level decline, and CO2 draw down (to 190 ppmv) at the last glacial maximum has been
calculated to have produced a negative (cooling) global climate forcing of about 4 to 6
Watts/m2. Interestingly, a positive (warming) 4 to 6 Watts/m2 forcing of the climate is rough-
ly what we expect for a doubling to a tripling of atmospheric CO2. This suggests that future
sea level rise due to ice sheet melting is likely to be a very lengthy, but substantial and an
inexorable process.
This slow melting of the ice sheets could be sped up substantially if the long-speculated
"collapse" of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) were actually to occur (Oppenheimer,
1998). The basis for the concern is that part of the WAIS is grounded on land that is below
sea level and part is in the form of floating ice shelves. If the grounded part were to
become detached for any reason, this could carry the potential for up to a 7 meter addition
to sea level. IPCC (2001) argues that it is very unlikely that a large sea level rise due to
collapse of the WAIS could occur in the 21st century. It is useful to note, however, that col-
lapse of the WAIS, if it were to occur, would require roughly a thousand years to carry itself
to completion. From this perspective, the word "collapse" is quite misleading when heard
by the non-specialist. "Slow detachment'' might be a more appropriate phrase.
The Greenland Ice Sheet is expected to melt at a much faster relative rate than would the
West Antarctic Ice Sheet. This is because essentially all of the highlands of Greenland
would be exposed to summertime melting if, say, a 5oC high northern latitude warming
were to occur within the next century or so. However, because of the greater than 3-kilo-
meter elevation of much of Antarctica, it is expected that the warmer climate would pro-
duce greater continental snowfall, thus producing a regional net ice accumulation over the
Antarctic Continent. Again, all of these processes act to produce large changes only on
time scales considerably longer than a century.  Thus, analogous to the warming of the
world ocean, the inertia of the great ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica slows down,
and greatly extends, the sea level response to increasing concentrations of greenhouse
gases.
It is important to point out, however, that the IPCC (2001) report only considered detailed
sea-level rise projections out to the year 2100, thus inadvertently deflecting attention away
from the real concerns about this problem. Yet, the body of the 2001 report did make a
special effort to point out that sea level-rise has the potential to continue for hundreds to
thousands of years in response to increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
VI. Implications for Millennial-Scale Trends in Sea Level 
In Section 4, we learned that emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere, if sustained at today's
high levels for much of the 21st century, have the potential to remain in the atmosphere for
multiple centuries. Thus, at these high CO2 levels, even a rapid draw down in CO2 emis-
sions is not accompanied by a rapid draw down of atmospheric CO2 concentrations.
Elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations are thus very likely to lead to elevated global
temperatures for at least the centuries required to draw-down the excessive CO2 concen-
The Long Time Scales of Human-Caused Climate Warming 17
trations back to pre-industrial levels, plus the added centuries required for the oceans
to give most of their accumulated heat back to space, roughly another 500 years (as
noted in Section 3).
Also, it was noted in Section 5 that the great ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica
can only melt substantially on time scales ranging from centuries to millennia. However,
it is thought that the Greenland ice sheet is likely to respond within centuries, at least at
its lower-elevation edges.  On the shorter time scale of the 21st century, Greenland is
expected to add to sea-level rise, while Antarctica is expected to produce a small net
negative contribution.  This is because negligible ice melting is expected at Antarctica’s
ice edges, while the warmer, wetter atmosphere is expected to cause a small net accu-
mulation of snow in the continental interior.
So, what do these various facts and circumstances tell us about expected sea-level
rise in response to global warming? First, it is important to note that IPCC (2001) chose
to emphasize only climate change up to the year 2100. If there actually is a large
reduction of global CO2 emissions throughout the 21st Century, it is reasonable to
assume that large future changes in global mean surface-air temperature would be
increasingly unlikely after 2100 (even though the oceans would continue to warm for
further centuries).
Note also that IPCC (2001) chose not to project sea-level rise amounts beyond the
year 2100, even though its Chapter 11, Changes in Sea Level, does discuss the
inevitability of sea-level rise for many centuries beyond 2100. They mention that, after
500 years, sea-level rise could range between 0.5 and 2 meters for a doubling of CO2
and twice that if we were to reach a quadrupling of CO2, just due to the effects of ther-
mal expansion of the warmed seawater.
IPCC (2001) also recognized that "ice sheets will continue to react to climate change,
even if the climate is stabilized." They note that a sustained 5.5oC climate warming
over Greenland would melt enough of its ice sheet in a thousand years to lead, by
itself, to a 3 meter sea-level rise. Note that a 5.5oC warming over Greenland is about
what mid-range climate models project for a stabilization at a doubling of atmospheric
CO2, a level generally acknowledged to be difficult to stay below.
These sea-level rise projections suggest very strongly that the sea-level issue has
been substantially overlooked in greenhouse gas emission mitigation negotiations to
date. The policy goal of eventual stabilization of CO2 concentrations is important, but
still shortsighted, simply because it incorrectly assumes that climate would then be sta-
bilized.  This is not true.  Such a major and laudable global policy achievement would
still commit earth to a continually rising sea level for the next millennium, a huge and
continuing challenge for humankind and the biosphere in coastal zones everywhere.
This inexorable sea-level rise would be driven by the millennium-scale increases in
global ocean temperature and the resultant inescapable thermal expansion of the
oceans. It would also be driven by the likely tendency of the Greenland ice sheet to
melt in the presence of the sustained higher temperatures, as explained above. 
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The bottom line is that sea-level rise is very likely to begin innocently enough at a very
slow rate, pick up its rate of increase as the earth’s climate system warms, and then sus-
tain it indefinitely, due to the intrinsically long time scales of atmospheric CO2, of the global
ocean warming rate, and of the ice sheet response of Greenland and Antarctica.  Thus,
even a very successful greenhouse gas emissions policy may be setting up a sea-level
rise "end game" that is well over 10 times longer than the roughly 150 year “setup time"
we will have spent getting into this situation.
VII. Implications of the “Global Warming Dilemma” for Climate
Change Policy 
In Section 1, it was noted that the current scientific knowledge base creates multiple chal-
lenges for global warming policymakers to overcome before truly meaningful mitigation
policies can be accomplished.  In Section 1, it is called the Global Warming Dilemma.
The factors leading to the Global Warming Dilemma are briefly restated here to provide a
setting for examining new policy possibilities and potential policy dead ends. 
Implementation of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol agreement has been thwarted on all sides
by major political and national self-interest barriers to achieving even modest levels
of net global CO2 emissions mitigation. 
Even perfect implementation of the important Kyoto Protocol will still only be a small
step toward the solution of the global warming problem.
Even if the near-term daunting policy goal of holding global CO2 emissions constant
through time were achieved, it would not come close to stopping further global warming.
It is now widely recognized that it will be very difficult to prevent an eventual doubling
of atmospheric CO2 concentrations over the pre-industrial amounts.
The above point shows that an "already-committed” irreducibly high warming amount
has exposed an unplanned “strategy” of substantial coping/adaptation to significant
climate change, almost independent of what politically and technologically acceptable
mitigation strategies are established. 
Modeling studies have shown that, even with a spectacular mitigation breakthrough
of holding atmospheric CO2 concentrations at their current levels, another 0.5-1.5°C
of climate warming is expected.
Carbon cycle models reveal that the more CO2 that we add to the atmosphere, the
longer it takes for natural processes to get it back out of the atmosphere over the
next several hundred years.
The very slow oceanic uptake of the added heat due to global warming will produce a
sea level rise that is "wired in” for the next thousand years and beyond.
The Long Time Scales of Human-Caused Climate Warming 19
Polar ice-sheet melting is likely to produce substantial sea-level rise that would
likely take considerably longer than would the contribution due to ocean warming.
The science of global warming has become increasingly solid over the past 20
years. A small, but effective, minority disputes these facts, mainly by pointing out
that significant details remain uncertain. Indeed, significant uncertainties do
remain.  The harsh reality, however, is that no viable alternative hypotheses to
current global warming knowledge yet exist, in spite of major efforts to construct
them. The likelihood of finding a planet-saving, substantially overestimating flaw in
the climate-change science now appears to be exceptionally low, less than a 1
percent chance.
It is not difficult to see why the sum of these well understood truths inevitably lead to
the harsh reality of the Global Warming Dilemma. Consider the policymakers' sincere
question: “What can we do in a mitigation context to keep global warming from happen-
ing?”  The blunt answer is almost nothing; climate change is well underway and it car-
ries huge momentum. Clearly, the question needs to be restated: “What are the options
available for us to manage this dauntingly difficult problem in the most globally respon-
sible way?”  In this form, the question is quite reasonable because it allows avenues for
finding rational approaches for dealing with the real problem.
VIII. Personal Comments
It has been clearly beyond the province of climate scientists to offer policy "solutions" to
this problem. After all, our expertise is in climate science, not technology, sociology,
economics, policy, or ethics. Yet, a number of climate scientists over the past 20 years
have assisted in framing out the questions, answers, and insights that science and sci-
entists can offer to assist the difficult policymaking process. For example, widespread
recognition of the hard science that has led to the daunting Global Warming Dilemma
should eventually lead to a maturation of global policy deliberations, well beyond the
almost Lilliputian political stances and frequently incorrect characterizations of the prob-
lem that still remain typical.  In that spirit, a number of observations are offered below
that may contribute to the maturation of these very difficult policy challenges.
Consider, for example, the kinds of arguments today that still dominate policymakers'
exchanges and press coverage of the problem.  “If we do anything meaningful now on
CO2 emissions, we will damage our economy!”  “If the problem is this daunting, the sci-
ence must be flawed!”  “We must act now to keep global warming from advancing any
further!”  “Science has surely underestimated the magnitude of the terrible effects that
will occur.”  “Science has surely underestimated the magnitude of the benign effects
that will occur!”  “Let's focus on scientific and political controversies; it sells newspapers
and raises ratings!” Most people reading this will almost surely have heard, and maybe
even agreed with, some of these perspectives. In my view all of these arguments will
be eventually exposed as being wrong, flawed, or emotional, simply because they con-
tain only partial and self-serving "truths".
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So, how much do the scientific facts comprising the Global Warming Dilemma provide
guidance to the world on how to respond? Quite a lot, in my opinion.  Consider the follow-
ing science-based, policy-relevant observations:  
There are no quick policy fixes, nationally or globally. 
If we don't begin to chip away at the problem soon, it is very likely that serious con-
sequences will be wired in for the world of our great-grandchildren and for their great-
grandchildren, etc. 
The previous item is only invalidated if essentially all of the current scientific knowl-
edge about climate change is completely wrong. 
The odds against all of the science being so wrong as to make the problem nearly go
away are now very small, less than a 1 percent chance. 
The long time scales of the problem highlighted above will inevitably change the poli-
cy debates in ways that we probably cannot yet foresee. 
The long time scales and robustness of the problem almost guarantees that our
descendants in the 22nd century will, with historical perspective, see that we were
actually confronted with a major planet-scale stewardship/management problem. 
They will most assuredly note how we responded, or how we did not respond to the
problem. 
They will also be aware of how our decisions or non-decisions today are still affecting
most aspects of their lives and their own continuing responses to the evolving chal-
lenge of human-caused climate warming.
With this clearer framing of the policy challenges, is the path to rational and sensible policy
choices on CO2 mitigation sufficiently clarified?  Are we now ready to make real and bind-
ing commitments that all can agree to and all can adhere to?  Probably not.  Not yet, any-
way.  It does seem clear, however, that policymakers could make far more substantive
progress if they were to be more thoroughly informed on how and why this problem is both
seriously important and seriously daunting, as outlined in the previous sections. However,
if policymakers were to be well grounded in these issues, would they then be able to
respond much more effectively?  Still, probably not. Numerous barriers to legitimate action
still lurk in arenas far broader than thorough grounding in climate science, far broader than
economic science, and far broader than innovative technological approaches.  
This next set of challenges appears to be within the realm of, for lack of a better all-
encompassing term, global  “values conflicts.”   It is within this realm that we can see more
clearly why it is that intelligent humans can perceive very different realities in the face of
what physical scientists might label as clear and objective facts. We do not need to focus
on distant or alien cultures to observe this phenomenon. We can see it in high-minded dis-
agreements between Republicans and Democrats, in 5/4 Supreme Court decisions, and in
international negotiations on any number of international non-climate issues, say biological
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warfare or international fishing rights. We can see it in sharply divergent assertions
from highly respected religious leaders.  We can see it almost everywhere we look in
the sacrifice of long-term goals for short-term interests and needs.
In the context of this essay, it might be helpful to frame this new set of challenges in
terms of these deeply held values conflicts. Ultimately, it will be these values conflicts
that must be reconciled at levels that objective science can partially guide, but certainly
cannot and should not control. Simply put, scientific knowledge ordinarily does not
change deeply held belief systems.
These values conflicts are an all encompassing label for the ubiquitous looming pres-
ence of sharply differing perspectives on what is important, what is treasured, and what
we believe, based upon our national, cultural, religious, political, economic, environ-
mental, and personal value systems.  In short, our perceptions of "right," "appropriate,"
or "good" are very much influenced by our personal and group value systems. Many of
us, personally and collectively, have often experienced having our most deeply held
values being perceived by others as odd, wrong, or hostile, often to our bafflement.
Why are values conflicts being raised here as major challenges in dealing with the con-
sequences of the objective science of global warming?  It is because values conflicts
lurk as impediments in a surprising number of the possible approaches to address the
challenges of global warming. For example, economic costs of CO2 mitigation policies
are now more frequently being weighed against future economic costs of coping and
adaptation to climate change. Yet, mitigation costs will likely be paid mostly by the tech-
nologically advanced wealthy nations, while coping and adaptation costs will likely be
paid mostly non-financially by the poorest and most vulnerable nations. How will the
world decide on a fair division of these very different costs? This is a very challenging
task made even more so by these two different costs being levied against two separate
human generations. It is even more challenging when one considers that these two
contrasting costs deal with very different currencies: economic costs for wealthy
nations and viability-of-life costs for the climate-impacted poorer nations. Clearly, such
radically different measures of cost must be evaluated in very different ways than those
to which we are currently accustomed.
Already values conflicts are evident between those who view human life as inherently
special relative to all other life forms (anthropocentric values) and those who view
humans as having a major ethical obligation as stewards of earth's environmental
health (environmental values). It is clear that adherents of both of these viewpoints
often regard their thinking and perspectives as being "morally sound" or "religiously
correct", or even "self evident”. These differing values positions also have led to very
different viewpoints on who “pays" for preservation of species and ecosystems-- the
humans that created the threat, or the species and ecosystems that may become non-
viable in the future? Clearly, these kinds of values conflicts cannot be easily reconciled
on economic grounds alone.
The above conflicts are expanded in scope when global population growth is consid-
ered. The anthropocentric viewpoint sees human population growth as either being
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benign or in terms of its possible impacts on the quality of human life.  The environmental
viewpoint sees it as a major and growing threat to all non-human life forms. The economic
viewpoint uses very different definitions of cost in the context of this problem. Again, these
differing “logically correct" and “morally correct" viewpoints are not readily reconciled.
As the global warming policy debates continue to mature, with an increasing recognition of
the multiple ways that values conflicts can inhibit real progress toward reducing the impact
of climate change, it will become increasingly clear that global policy negotiations must
mature to levels well beyond today's largely ineffective efforts. Will this happen?  Who
knows?  It does seem, however, that it is almost inevitable that the global warming mitiga-
tion deliberations will eventually be far more oriented toward recognizing and reconciling
national-scale and global-scale values conflicts than is evident today.  The key question,
given the momentum of the global warming problem is “when”?
I assert that progress can be greatly advanced through widespread recognition of the
harsh, but true, science-based message of the Global Warming Dilemma. This, by itself,
can force the policy making process to be far more reality grounded than what is evident
from today's halting efforts, both in the U.S and globally. Progress can be advanced con-
siderably further when the global-scale “values conflicts” are recognized and respected,
and are also seen as a basis for beginning the very difficult process of finding values com-
promises that are productive and meaningful in the long run.  This is likely to prove to be
dauntingly difficult. However, given the importance of this century-scale global challenge,
future historians will be evaluating our level of success, or lack thereof, in resolving our
global values conflicts and in achieving meaningful progress on the global warming prob-
lem.
The Long Time Scales of Human-Caused Climate Warming 23
Footnotes
1 The following phrases are used to describe judgmental estimates of confidence:  vir-
tually certain (greater than a 99 percent chance that a result is true); very likely (90-99
percent chance); likely (66-90 percent chance) (from (Mahlman, 1997; IPCC, 2001).
2 Parts of this section were taken from a previous essay by the author (Mahlman,
1998).
3 It is straightforward to perform simple one-dimensional radiative/convective model cal-
culations of the climate effects of reducing CO2. The log-linear relationship has been
found to hold down to CO2 concentrations to as low as one sixty-fourth of pre-industrial
levels. As CO2 is decreased, the atmosphere’s ability to hold water vapor collapses and
the global temperatures drop sharply, leaving CO2 as the clearly dominant greenhouse
gas.
4 Relative humidity is the ratio (in percentage) of the vapor pressure of air to its satura-
tion vapor pressure. The saturation vapor pressure of air, determined from the
Clausius-Claperon equation of classical thermodynamics, is a strong exponential func-
tion of temperature, roughly doubling for each 10oC. Water vapor mixing ratio is the
mass of water vapor of air divided by the mass of dry air; it is generally conserved for a
few days following an air parcel when no condensation is present.
5 Relative humidity (see Footnote 4) is determined in the troposphere by the interplay
among: evaporation at the earth’s surface; upward transfer of water vapor (by small-
scale turbulence; thunderstorm-scale moist convection; large-scale rising motion); and
net removal by precipitation. Equally important is the local lowering of relative humidity
in the troposphere due to adiabatic warming in regions of descending air under approx-
imate conservation of water vapor mixing ratio. Any appeal to a sharp change in mean
relative humidity in a warming climate thus implicitly hypothesizes a substantial change
in the dynamical behavior of the troposphere, in this case a large change in the
motions of the troposphere in response to a comparatively small perturbation to the
thermodynamics of the climate system.
6 The term “climate sensitivity” typically refers to the level of equilibrium global-mean
surface air temperature increase that the climate system would experience in response
to a doubling of  atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Each model has its own climate sen-
sitivity, almost guaranteed to be somewhat different from the unknown value for the real
climate.
7 Clouds are effective absorbers and reflectors of solar (visible plus ultraviolet) and
absorbers/re-emitters of infrared radiation. Their net effect is to cool the planet, but the
effect is very small relative to the 33oC “atmosphere/no atmosphere” difference noted
above. However, for projecting the smaller human-caused climate changes examined
here, the effect of clouds becomes crucially important.
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Notes
On October 11 - 12, 2001, The Pew Center on
Global Climate Change held a Workshop on the
Timing of Climate Change Policies in Washington,
D.C. This workshop brought together leading econo-
mists, scientists, policy-makers, business leaders,
and others interested in climate change science
and policy.
The purpose of the workshop was to investigate the
appropriate timing of the world's policy response to
the challenge of global climate change. The work-
shop produced a consensus that action on climate
change needs to begin now to satisfy a variety of
concerns. 
A summary of the workshop proceedings, final texts
of peer-reviewed papers commissioned for the
workshop, and other presentation materials are
available at www.pewclimate.org
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